Discusses the interrelations between the aspects of human emotions. Intentionality; Expressivity; Moral significance; Kinds of philosophical views of emotions; Cognitivists; Emotivists; Moral phenomenologism of Annette Baier; Efforts of Baier to avoid the reductionism of cognitivists and emotivists; Attention to Baier's notion of deep objects of emotions; Account of the expressivity of emotions; Implications for the understanding of the role of emotions in moral lives.

Hobbes takes the true morality to consist in obedience to dictates of reason that secure peace and commodious living. One of these, the fifth, requires 'compleasance,' (sic) or mutual accommodation, and he says those who keep it are the 'commodi'. Commodious or sociable living is part of the moral goal, and sociability part of the necessary means. Reason, for Hobbes, itself depends upon speech and the mutual accommodation involved in that "noblest invention of all other." The dictates of reason do not initiate human sociability, but presuppose and protect it.

Trust is of central moral importance, both as a great good, and as the prior condition of the evils of betrayal and conspiracy. Our tradition in moral philosophy has offered no general account of when we should trust, and meet trust. The attention given to contractual agreement, in that tradition, is attention to one form of trust--that between more or less equals, once they have voluntarily become mutual trusters, on a limited matter for a limited time. A more general account is offered, and a moral test for trust-relationships.

A moral theory is usually the outcome of a single individual's ruminations about what version of morality merits our support--a web of arguments appealing to our intellects. Morality itself is a social product--a set of customs and standards for evaluating laws, customs, characters. A moral theory would be less limited if like its subject matter it were a cooperative product, and appealed to heart and guts as well as intellect and self-interest.

Different from men's, then one would expect women's moral philosophy also to exhibit different emphases, as indeed it has. That work, so far, contains little "theory." is moral theory a male product, the wish for theory tied to male moral prejudices? Could any moral theory systematize and extend the intuitions of both women and men? It would need to contain an account both of obligation and of the ethics of love and care. A theory taking the concepts of proper trust and proper response to trust to be central might accomplish this double task.

Moral philosophers do "theory," or "apply" someone else's theory, helped by their own intuitions, to decisions others have to take. We advise other professions on their professional ethics. If really reflective, we should reflect on our social niche. Should a society pay so many of us to do what we do? We should improve our own professional ethics before advising others on theirs.

Frankena's treatment of the moral point of view as the source of less final practical judgments than those made by practical reason, simply as such, is compared with hume's version of the moral point of view. The role of sympathy, the claimed relation of morality to ultimate rationality, the reducibility of point-of-view talk to other locutions, is investigated in the two philosophers' accounts of morality. More disagreements than agreements are found between the two, despite the shared locution of the "moral point of view".

The dualism which strawson attributes to descartes is only half of descartes' total view, since he has a different account of how we should conceive of ourselves when what we are doing is seeking the good, rather than searching for metaphysical truth. Behind the metaphysical dualism lies the methodological dualism of theory and practice, thought and action. Descartes' and strawson's accounts of persons and of consciousness are compared, and second person psychological claims are found to be as important as first and third person claims.

Hume says that to be a right-holder, a party to conventions of justice, one must have power to make resentment felt. The relation of resentment, for hume an instinctive passion, to the "irregular" passion of envy and the "mixed" passion of respect is explored, and the role of the concepts of power and social status in hume's philosophy highlighted. As instinctive benevolence is the attendant protector of the indirect passion of love, so resentment is the watchdog attendant of pride. Pride, since it is always pride in possession, is essentially pride in power. Both resentment, and each proud person's need for the esteem of others, generates a humean dynamic (foreshadowing the hegelian dialectic) whereby, given the postulated psychology, moral equilibrium can come out of conflict.

Past persons are believed to have rights, for example the right to have their properly made private wills executed. We recognize present persons as spokesmen for past persons, claiming their rights. We could appoint present persons as spokesmen for the general human rights of future persons without conceptual or moral incoherence. Indeed our obligations to past persons includes the obligation to pass on to future generations those transmitted goods, such as constitutions, and also unpoisoned water and air, which we inherited from past persons. In as a far as past persons made efforts to create or preserve, and to pass on, such goods, it was not to pass them on only to us, but to an indefinite run of generations. Our obligations to past and to future persons reinforce one another.

Hume concludes his discussion of artificial virtues with a section on modesty and chastity, which provide, he says, still more conspicuous instances of artifice. It is argued, on the contrary, that chastity is an atypical humean artificial virtue in several respects. It is an artificial virtue in women whose point, on hume's account, is to make paternity determinable and so make possible the natural male virtue of parental affection. What is more, its utility depends not on universal practice in the female sex, but on each single woman's exceptionless practice. Indeed, hume assumes that not all women will aspire to the status of mothers of children of recognized lineage. Both the chastity of respectable women and the greater liberty of males depends upon the existence of women whose social "virtues" will be the absence of chastity and modesty. In all these respects hume's account of chastity raises general theoretical questions about the nature, scope, and utility of all hume's social artifices.

Four features of "realize" distinguish it from "know" and show realization to be of epistemological interest. "realize" rejects a "whether"-complement, and the accusative and infinitive construction. These indicate a loose link between realizing and prior question-raising. Not "know", as vendler claimed, but "realize" lacks interrogative flavor. The limited use for 'i do not realize...' and the deviance of 'you, but not i, realize...' indicate that realization, unlike knowledge, cannot be recognized without being shared.

Several features of chisholm's analysis of intention are cited to show that his attempt to analyze intention without relying on the concept of action is unsatisfactory. These include a too narrowly causal account of the means end relation involved in purposive action, a failure to exclude intentions to do the impossible, a failure to distinguish competent intentional action from lucky wish fulfillment, or intention to do from consent to another's act. It is claimed that the proper objects of intention are acts, not states of affairs.