Some forms of envy and resentment are centrally connected with a concern for justice and so should not be morally condemned but accepted. Envy and resentment enable us to discern and respond to injustices against our selves and others. I argue that whereas envy and resentment as character traits or dispositions may be ethically deplorable, as episodic emotions they can be both moral responses to injustice and lead to action against injustice.

The notion of the philosophical imaginary developed by Michèle Le Doeuff refers to the capacity to imagine as well as to the stock of images philosophers employ. Making use of this notion, Marguerite La Caze explores the idea of the imaginary of analytic philosophy. Noting the marked tendency of analytic philosophy to be unselfconscious about the use of figurative language and the levels at which it works, La Caze shows how analytic images can work to define the parameters of debates and exclude differing approaches, including feminist ones. La Caze focuses on five influential types of images in five central areas of contemporary analytic philosophy: analogies and how they are used in the abortion debates; thought experiments in personal identity; the myth of the social contract; Thomas Nagel's use of visual and spatial metaphors in epistemology; and Kendall Walton's use of children's games as a foundational model in aesthetics. The author shows how the image promotes assumptions and conceals tensions in philosophical works, how the image persuades, and how it limits debate and excludes ideas. In providing an analysis of and reflection on the nature of the analytic imaginary, La Caze suggests that a more open-ended and reflexive approach can result in richer, more fruitful, philosophical work.

In a reading of René Descartes's 'The Passions of the Soul', Luce Irigaray explores the possibility that wonder, first of all passions, can provide the basis for an ethics of sexual difference because it is prior to judgment, and thus nonhierarchical. For Descartes, the passion of generosity gives the key to ethics. I argue that wonder should be extended to other differences and should be combined with generosity to form the basis of an ethics.

Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognize injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.