The paper has to do with Peter Singer's statement 'A German Attack on Applied Ethics', and particularly with the claim that those who protested against his speaking at conferences in Europe in 1989 failed to recognise his right to freedom of expression.
I argue that the right to free expression does not mean that we may say anything at all, to anyone at all, anywhere at all. Visitors to foreign countries, for example, have some obligation to be sensitive to local concerns.
I also argue that there is an important difference between free expression, which is a basic right, and regular access to public platforms, which is a special right or privilege. This special right or privilege goes with certain jobs and professions, and could not be made universal. The German and Austrian protests against Singer temporarily deprived him of the privilege of access to a platform but were not attacks on the basic right of free speech as such. In fact the protests themselves could be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the right of free expression.

Deconstruction is commonly associated with the philosophy of Derrida. But there are also non-philosophers who say they engage in deconstruction, for example architects, anthropologists and literary critics. This may lead some people to suppose that deconstruction is not concerned with specifically philosophical problems.

This paper addresses two related questions: 1. Does human life have a purpose? and 2. Is human life intrinsically valuable?
Clearly human beings have personal, communal and common purposes, but we cannot know whether there is an external transcendent purpose in addition to these. However the argument that mundane purposes are meaningless without transcendent purposes, though valid, rests on false premises. There are four ways of explaining the intrinsic value of life. The first (pantheism) is the idea that human life is sacred because everything is sacred. A second is that life is intrinsically valuable because something else is valuable and indeed sacred – the idea, for instance, that mankind is made in the image of God. The third is that human life lacks value because of its contrast with the sanctity of the gods. The humanistic explanation is that human life as such has intrinsic value.
There are (at least) six reasons for holding that human life is intrinsically valuable; these reasons are given.

Disagreement about terrorism due to fact that the word is used polemically. "Ordinary usage" definitions should be rejected. Terrorism originally meant government terror. Later it meant tyrannicide. Now it means violent rebellion involving acts like hostage-taking, attacks on neutrals. Terrorism best defined as a spectrum of three overlapping classes: state terrorism (reigns of terror); assassination of rulers or their agents; and "modern" terrorism, a species of nationalistic rebellion involving atrocities. Justification of acts of terror depends where in the spectrum they fall. Tyrannicide sometimes justified, atrocities never. No reason to suppose atrocity a specially effective method of warfare.

This book is a philosophical and historical examination of two theories of the moral status of war. It is argued that philosophers standardly misdefine pacifism; that the better-known current anti-pacifist arguments are invalid; that the classical theory of the just war contains inconsistencies; and that while neither theory is ultimately satisfactory, the arguments in favor of pacifism are considerably stronger than philosophers (ancient and modern) have ever allowed.

The aim and purpose of this short essay is to prove that all philosophers since john locke (1632-1704) have completely buggered up the analysis of the concept of "person".

The main thesis of this paper is that pacifism is not as incoherent doctrine; contra the arguments of several contemporary philosophers. It seems to me that contemporary philosophers generally give pacifism a pretty raw deal. I have in mind especially the following: Mr Barrie Paskins, Professor Jan Narveson and Professor Anscombe. The usual move is to first misdescribe pacifism and then to attack the straw man.
(First paragraph)

Mr Bennett in his interesting essay in the April 1974 issue of Philosophy claims that ‘… in a particular case sympathy and morality may pull in opposite directions. This can happen not just with bad moralities, but also with good ones like yours and mine.’ By sympathy he says he means ‘every sort of fellow-feeling’. Although a triumph of sympathy over morality may be a good thing, it also represents a triumph of irrationality over reason.

Certain unwise, careless, or as we say, ‘self-destructive’ actions often bring in their train consequences unpleasant to the agent according to natural law. If an agent through folly or otherwise acts in a way which shows that he has ignored or forgotten predictable or possible consequences people will say ‘it serves him right’, meaning ‘he ought to have foreseen that’. Sometimes they will even say ‘he got what he deserved’. For these reasons such consequences can be called punishment, or a kind of punishment.

This is an examination of the relation of mental causation and behavioral effects. The author focuses on the role that consciousness plays in determining whether a given effect is to be assigned a mental cause. Consciousness is to be thought of as (1) the definitional criterion for a thing's being mental and therefore a "mental cause," (2) the false idea that consciousness is a kind of extra sense which certifies a given experience, and (3) a link in the causal chain.

Teichmann considers two objections to the claim that there are such things as propositions, the objection that the notion is superfluous, and that it is obscure. She devotes most of her discussion to the latter objection, especially to the claim that no satisfactory criterion of identity has been given for propositions. She considers several analyses of propositions, and shows how criteria, though perhaps not necessary and sufficient conditions, can be worked out for propositions.